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THE CASE FOR ABOLISHING FITNESS
HEARINGS IN JUVENILE COURT
Leonard Edwards*
INTRODUCTION
The use of the fitness hearing' is one of the most debated
issues in juvenile law today.' At this hearing, the juvenile court
determines whether a minor is a fit and proper subject for
juvenile court law. If the minor is found to be "unfit," he or she
is transferred from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to the
criminal courts.
The fitness hearing controversy has generated numerous
legislative proposals.' The California legislature in both 1975
and 1976 made significant changes in the hearing procedure.,
These statutory efforts, however, have not resolved the basic
* B.A., 1963, Wesleyan University; J.D., 1966, University of Chicago Law School;
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Professor Michael Wald, Peter Bull, Sheldon Portman, Frank D. Berry, Jr., and Carol
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1. This hearing has been given many names, including: waiver, transfer, certifi-
cation, remand, removal, declination of jurisdiction and fitness hearing. See NATIONAL
JUVENILE LAW CENTER, LAW AND TACTICS IN JUVENILE CASES § 11.2, at 251 (2d ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as LAW AND TACTICS]. For the technically correct use of these terms
in California, see Comment, Juveniles in the Criminal Courts: A Substantive View of
the Fitness Decision, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 988, 991 n.16 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Juveniles]. See also Advisory Council of Judges, National Council on
Crime & Delinquency, Transfer of Cases Between Juvenile and Criminal Courts: A
Policy Statement, 8 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 3, 4 (1962).
In this article, the term fitness hearing will be used to refer to the procedure
whereby a juvenile may be cut off from the resources of the juvenile court.
2. Another strongly debated issue deals with what is to be done with children in
need of supervision. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1977). See
generally McNulty & White, The Juvenile's Right to Treatment: Panacea or Pandora's
Box?, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 745 (1976).
3. See, e.g., Piersma, Ganousis & Kramer, The Juvenile Court: Current Prob-
lems, Legislative Proposals, and a Model Act, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 88 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Piersma]. For the sections of the Model Juvenile Court Act
proposed by Piersma relating to the fitness hearing, see app. D infra. During the 1975-
76 regular session of the California Assembly at least three separate bills were intro-
duced relating to the fitness hearing. See A.B. 2385, art. 9.5; A.B. 2672, § 22; A.B. 3001,
§ 15.
4. With the passage and signing of A.B. 3121 (1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1071, §
28.5, at 4526), the law relating to fitness hearings changed for the second time in as
many years. While this article will focus on the present law, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 707 (West Supp. 1977), reference to the pre-1976 law and the 1976 law will be
necessary. The pre-1976, 1976, and present laws are set out in appendices A, B, and C
infra, respectively.
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question raised by the fitness hearing: to what extent does this
hearing serve the dual purpose of the juvenile justice sys-
tem-maximizing rehabilitation of the minor and protection of
the public.5 The position taken in this article is that, in Califor-
nia, the fitness hearing is unnecessary and should be abol-
ished.' The juvenile court should retain jurisdiction over all
persons under the age of eighteen.7
In examining the fitness hearing it is important to keep in
mind the relationship between the juvenile justice system' and
the criminal justice system. Unique to the juvenile system is
5. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 502 (West Supp. 1977) provides:
(a) The purpose of this chapter is to secure for each minor under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court such care and guidance, preferably in
his own home, as will serve the spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical
welfare of the minor and the best interests of the state; to protect the
public from criminal conduct by minors; to impose on the minor a sense
of responsibility for his own acts; to preserve and strengthen the minor's
family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his
parents only when necessary for his welfare or for the safety and protec-
tion of the public; and, when the minor is removed from his own family,
to secure for him custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equiv-
alent to that which should have been given by his parents. This chapter
shall be liberally construed to carry out these purposes.
(b) The purpose of this chapter also includes the protection of the pub-
lic from the consequences of criminal activity, and to such purpose proba-
tion officers, peace officers, prosecuting attorneys and juvenile courts
shall take into account such protection of the public in their determina-
tions under this chapter.
All references to California statutes in the text will be to the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code, unless otherwise specified.
6. The idea is not new although no one has previously worked out the details
necessary for implementation. See generally THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, TASK
FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 24-25 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as TASK FORCE REPORT]; Edwards, The Rights of Children, 37 FED. PROBATION 34, 38
(June, 1973); Sargent & Gordon, Waiver of Jurisdiction: An Evaluation of the Process
in the Juvenile Court, 9 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 121, 128 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Sargent & Gordon].
7. This second recommendation is closely related to the thesis that the fitness
hearing should be abolished. Some states, such as New York, have no fitness hearing,
but instead have reduced the jurisdictional age of those eligible for juvenile court from
18 to 15. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976). See also VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 33, § 632(a)(1) (Supp. 1976). Under such a system, 16- and 17-year-olds are ex-
cluded from juvenile court by their age alone.
The age of 18 should be retained because there is something to be gained by
keeping younger persons in a justice system dedicated to rehabilitation. Furthermore,
most 16- and 17-year-olds are now successfuly handled in juvenile court without resort
to the fitness hearing. See text accompanying notes 119-131 infra.
8. See A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS (1969) and Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An
Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970) for the history of the creation of
juvenile courts.
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"the philosophy that erring children should be protected and
rehabilitated rather than subjected to the harshness of the
criminal system."9 In California, the expressed purposes for
establishing a distinct process for minors'0 include serving "the
spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the
minor" as well as protecting "the public from the consequences
of criminal activity."" Whether the interests of either the
minor or the public are served by transferring selected sixteen-
or seventeen-year olds out of the juvenile courts is the focus of
this article.
The United States Supreme Court has observed that "the
waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction is a 'critically important'
action determining vitally important rights of the juvenile."' 2
Several commentators consider it the most critical hearing in
the juvenile court." The decision to transfer jurisdiction can
result in long sentences, harsh conditions or incarceration, ex-
posure to adult felons," the establishment of permanent crimi-
nal records, and the loss of the special procedures, treatment,
9. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
10. A separate juvenile justice system of courts, procedures and language has
been created by the California Legislature. For example, there is no right to bail or a
bail hearing in juvenile court; there is instead a detention hearing. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §§ 632-633 (West 1972). The trial stage of the juvenile process is referred to as
the jurisdictional hearing, id. §§ 700-01 (West Supp. 1977), while the sentencing stage
is called the dispositional hearing. Id. § 702. The charge against the minor is referred
to as a petition which is brought on the minor's behalf. Id. § 650. The minor is not
found guilty or not guilty; instead the minor is found to be or not to be a person
described by sections 300, 601, or 602. Id. §§ 701-702.
11. Id. § 502. For the text of this section, see note 5 supra.
12. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 546 (1966).
13. Clayman, Fitness-The Critical Hearing of the Juvenile Court, 50 L.A. B.
BULL. 133 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Clayman]; Schornhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile
Court Jurisdiction: Kent Revisited, 43 IND. L.J. 583, 586 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Schornhorst]; Stamm, Transfer Jurisdiction in Juvenile Court: An Analysis of the
Proceeding, Its Role in the Administration of Justice, and a Proposal for the Reform
of Kentucky Law, 62 Ky. L.J. 122, 142-45 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Stamm). See
Sargent & Gordon, supra note 6; Comment, Representing the Juvenile Defendant in
Waiver Proceedings, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 424, 428 (1968).
14. Jail is not one of the dispositions available to a juvenile court judge. CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 727, 730, 731 (West Supp. 1977). See In re Kirk G., 67 Cal.
App. 3d 538, 136 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1977).
15. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 781 (West Supp. 1977). Perhaps the most
important right available exclusively to the juvenile is the right to have his record
sealed pursuant to § 781. The discovery that a person has a criminal record can greatly
hinder any rehabilitative efforts made on his behalf. See generally Hayden, How Much
Does the Boss Need to Know, 3 Civ. LIB. REV. No. 3, at 23 (1976); Schiavo, Condemned
by the Record, 55 A.B.A.J. 540 (1969); Schwartz & Skolnick, Two Studies in Legal
Stigma, 10 Soc. PROB. 133 (1962).
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and rehabilitative programs that are available to the minor
through the juvenile court process."9 The gravity of the fitness
hearing was aptly put by one commentator: "Any transfer of
jurisdiction strikes at the most basic philosophical elements of
the juvenile court system, for it is an admission that the system
cannot or does not want to try to rehabilitate one member of
the class of individuals for whom it was created."' 7
Despite these observations, the fitness hearing has been
retained and expanded in California.'" The rationales for main-
taining the fitness hearing are based, in part, on the assump-
tions that certain youths are too hardened or dangerous to be
included in the juvenile system,'" that some have committed
crimes demanding longer sentences than the juvenile justice
system can offer, and that insufficient resources are available
for rehabilitation within the juvenile system. 0
Before evaluating these rationales within the context of
the entire juvenile justice system, this article examines the
procedural framework of the fitness hearing and recent legisla-
tive changes. In particular, the newly delineated standards for
determining fitness will be discussed. Data on the use of the
hearing and the standards employed in certain California coun-
ties will be analyzed. Finally, the article concludes with an
argument for eliminating the fitness hearing from the juvenile
justice system.
THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FITNESS HEARING
Initiating the Fitness Hearing Process
Until recently the timing of the fitness hearing under Cali-
fornia law was uncertain. Appellate decisions had suggested
16. See text accompanying notes 130-131 infra.
17. Stamm, supra note 13, at 145. Judge Bazelon has also stressed the impor-
tance of this decision: "[T]o brand a child a criminal for life is harsh enough retribu-
tion for almost any offense. But it becomes an all but inconceivable response when we
realize that to so brand him may in fact make him a criminal for life." Bazelon,
Racism, Classism, and the Juvenile Process, 53 JUDICATURE 373, 373 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Bazelon].
18. See note 3 supra.
19. The fact that the minor may have been placed on juvenile probation and then
reverted to delinquent activity is closely related to this assumption.
20. See H. THOMPSON, CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT DESKBOOK § 10.4, at 149-52
(1976) [hereinafter cited as THOMPSON]; Sargent & Gordon, supra note 6, at 122-25;
Stamm, supra note 13, at 150-51; Comment, Juveniles, supra note 1, at 992-93. See




the issue might be considered before, during, or even after the
jurisdictional hearing (trial).2' That confusion was resolved in
Breed v. Jones,2 where the United States Supreme Court ruled
that a minor once in jeopardy in a juvenile court proceeding
may not be prosecuted on the same charge under the general
criminal law. California codified that holding in 1976 by pro-
viding that the fitness hearing shall be "prior to the attach-
ment of jeopardy. '2 3 The 1977 statute contains this same lan-
guage.14 As a result, the question of fitness must be decided
before the first witness is sworn at the jurisdictional hearing.25
Fitness is raised first upon the motion of the petitioner."
Under prior law the petitioner was the probation department; 7
current law designates the prosecuting attorney.2" The presence
of the prosecuting attorney as petitioner at all stages of the
juvenile process may be the most significant change that has
occurred in the juvenile court since its inception. The prosecut-
ing attorney will bring to juvenile court many of the practices
employed in the criminal court. For example, the prosecuting
attorney, familiar with the plea bargain" under the criminal
system, may be tempted to initiate the practice of not petition-
ing for a fitness hearing, in discretionary cases, in exchange for
an admission by the minor.3" Such a practice could have a
21. See discussion and cases cited in THOMPSON, supra note 20, at § 10.4; Clay-
man, supra note 13, at 136.
22. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
23. 1975 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1266, § 4, at 3559 (repealed 1976). See apps.
B & C infra.
24. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a) (West Supp. 1977). See app. C infra.
25. This conclusion is the author's interpretation of the current law. A recent
case held that jeopardy had not attached under 1968 proceedings when the juvenile
court judge decided to raise the fitness issue on the basis of evidence introduced at the
jurisdictional hearing. In re Wright, 67 Cal. App. 3d 122, 136 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1977).
Cf. In re Bryan, 16 Cal. 3d 782, 548 P.2d 693, 129 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1976) (the holding in
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), rejecting continuing jeopardy in juvenile-criminal
proceedings as double jeopardy, was given retroactive effect).
26. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 650(b) (West Supp. 1977).
27. 1961 Cal. Stats. ch. 1616, § 2, at 3477. See app. A infra.
28. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 650(b), 681 (West Supp. 1977).
29. The use of the plea bargain and sentence bargain in California juvenile courts
is not well documented. See THOMPSON, supra note 20, at § 8.19. From the author's
observations and interviews in Santa Clara County, the practice is not often used. In
fact, there appears to be a policy against plea bargaining on the part of the probation
department in Santa Clara County, and sentence bargaining at the dispositional phase
has been rarely practiced by the probation officers. Whether the prosecuting attorney
will enter into sentence bargaining remains to be seen.
30. The prosecuting attorney, with his experience in the courts of criminal juris-
diction, is more familiar with the plea bargain and the sentence bargain than is the
probation officer. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1191-1191.5 (West 1970). In Illinois, the
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chilling effect upon the minor's desire to have a contested juris-
dictional hearing.
The prosecutor as petitioner decides whether the fitness
issue will be raised for any eligible sixteen or seventeen year
old.' In practice, other interested parties may request that the
issue be heard.3"
Only minors described in section 602 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code 3 -those accused of- violating criminal
laws-are subject to the fitness hearing. Minors described by
sections 30011 (formerly section 600) and 601,11 such as runa-
power to petition on the question of fitness is reportedly often used to force minors to
admit to a petition rather than be subjected to the fitness hearing procedures. Inter-
view with Ron Katz, Supervisor of the Juvenile Department, Cook County Public
Defender's Office, Chicago, Ill. (Dec., 1975). The author knows of no such practices
by district attorneys in California. For a review of the plea bargaining tactics available
to the attorney in juvenile court, see D. BESHAROV, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCACY: PRAC-
TICE IN A UNIQUE COURT 311-34 (1974) [hereinafter cited as BESHAROV].
31. There has been some confusion as to the meaning of the statute. Some dis-
trict attorneys interpret the statute to mean that whenever a minor is charged with
one of the eleven crimes listed in CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b) (West Supp. 1977)
(see app. C infra), there must be a fitness hearing. Other district attorneys believe it
is within their discretion to ask for a fitness hearing in any case. The language of the
statute seems to indicate that the latter position is correct.
32. The judge probably has the power to raise the fitness issue sua sponte, even
though the prosecutor does not see fit to do so. Green v. Municipal Court, 67 Cal. App.
3d 794, 136 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1976). See also People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho), 11
Cal. 3d 59, 520 P.2d 405, 113 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1974); Esteybar v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal.
3d 119, 485 P.2d 1129, 95 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1972); People v. Tenario, 3 Cal. 3d 89, 473
P.2d 993, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1970). It is unclear what the result would be if a judge
ordered the district attorney to request a fitness hearing and the district attorney
refused.
33. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West Supp. 1977) provides:
Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of
this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county
of this state defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew
based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which
may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
34. Id. § 300 provides:
Any person under the age of 18 years who comes within any of the follow-
ing descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may
adjudge such person to be a dependant child of the court:
(a) Who is in need of proper and effective parental care or control and
has no parent or guardian, or has no parent or guardian willing to exercise
or capable of exercising such care or control, or has no parent or guardian
actually exercising such care or control.
(b) Who is destitute, or who is not provided with the necessities of life,
or who is not provided with a home or suitable place of abode.
(c) Who is physically dangerous to the public because of a mental or
physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality.
(d) Whose home is an unfit place for him by reason of neglect, cruelty,
depravity, or physical abuse of either of his parents, or of his guardian or
other person in whose custody or care he is.
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ways, minors beyond control of one's parents, minors in need
of care and curfew violators,36 are never subject to transfer to
the criminal system. Furthermore, minors must have been six-
teen or seventeen years old at the time of the alleged violation
before they are eligible for a fitness hearing. 7 Minors who were
under sixteen years old at the commission of the alleged viola-
tion must be retained by the juvenile court, while individuals
eighteen or over at that time must be prosecuted under the
general law in adult criminal courts.
Rights of the Minor
Notice. The minor must receive written notice of the ju-
risdictional hearing,38 but there is no explicit requirement of
notice for the fitness hearing. The Supreme Court of California
in Donald L. v. Superior Court declared that the law must be
read to "require a hearing with adequate notice to the minor
and his counsel on the issue of the minor's fitness for care and
treatment under the Juvenile Court Law."3 Apparently, this
requirement has been satisfied in many counties by oral notifi-
cation to the minor or his attorney," but the statute itself is
35. Id. § 601 provides:
(a) Any person under the age of 18 years who persistently or habitually
refuses to obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of his par-
ents, guardian, or custodian, or who is beyond the control of such person,
or who is under the age of 18 years when he violated any ordinance of any
city or county of this state establishing a curfew based solely on age is
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge such
person to be a ward of the court.
(b) If a school attendance review board determines that the available
public and private services are insufficient or inappropriate to correct the
habitual truancy of the minor, or to correct the minor's persistent or
habitual refusal to obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of
school authorities, or if the minor fails to respond to directives of a school
attendance review board or to services provided, the minor is then within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge such person to
be a ward of the court; provided, that it is the intent of the Legislature
that no minor who is adjudged a ward of the court pursuant solely to this
subdivision shall be removed from the custody of the parent or guardian
except during school hours.
36. The current law excludes curfew violations from the purview of section 602.
Id. § 602.
37. Id. § 707(a). See app. C infra. It is important to note that most 16- and 17-
year-olds in the juvenile court do not have a fitness hearing. See text accompanying
notes 107-109 infra.
38. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 658, 659 (West Supp. 1977).
39. 7 Cal. 3d 592, 597, 498 P.2d 1098, 1100-01, 102 Cal. Rptr. 850, 852-53 (1972).
40. In Santa Clara County, for instance, written notice of a fitness hearing is not
provided. See Clayman, supra note 13, at 135, who notes that Los Angeles County, on
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silent. If the fitness hearing is to be retained, this procedural
flaw should be remedied by requiring written notice of the
hearing to the minor and his attorney sufficiently in advance
to allow for adequate preparation.41
Another procedural difficulty concerns the specificity of
the notice. The statute does not require the petitioner to indi-
cate which of the five statutory grounds42 are the bases for the
unfitness claim. Furthermore, it is not clear if the court would
be restricted to consideration of the grounds set out in the
notice.43
Right to counsel. The minor is entitled to representation
by counsel at the fitness hearing." The minor and his attorney
also have the right to present any relevant evidence during the
hearing45 and to call witnesses, including expert witnesses, on
the minor's behalf. 46
The accused minor can waive his right to have an attorney
at the fitness hearing, as he can at any stage of the juvenile
proceedings.47 Some minors proceed through the fitness hearing
without counsel s.4  The minor can also consent to the recom-
mendation of fitness and not contest the issue.49 It is doubtful,
the other hand, requires written notice.
41. A recently published model juvenile statute would require written notice 72
hours prior to the fitness hearing. Piersma, supra note 3, at 94. The model act, as it
relates to waiver hearings, is reproduced in app. D infra. See also CAL. JUV. CT. R.
1346(b), which requires written notice five judicial days prior to the fitness hearing.
See In re J.T., 40 Cal. App. 3d 633, 115 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1974) (parent must be given
notice of specific allegations in a dependency proceeding under CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1977) (formerly § 600)).
42. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a)(1)-(5) (West Supp. 1977). See app. C infra.
43. For instance, if the district attorney noticed that the minor was unfit based
upon "the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor," id. § 707(a)(1),
and there was insufficient evidence as to that ground, would the district attorney be
precluded from bringing up another ground not previously noticed?
44. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). See In re Harris, 67 Cal. 2d 876,
879, 434 P.2d 615, 617, 64 Cal. Rptr. 319, 321 (1967), where the California Supreme
Court stated that the principles set down in Kent were of a constitutional dimension.
45. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a) (West Supp. 1977). See app. C infra.
46. On the use of expert witnesses at the fitness hearing, see Jimmy H. v. Supe-
rior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 709, 714-15, 478 P.2d 32, 35, 91 Cal. Rptr. 600, 603, (1970); People
v. Allgood, 54 Cal. App. 3d 434, 454-55, 126 Cal. Rptr. 666, 680 (1976).
47. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 700 (West Supp. 1977).
48. BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, DIVISION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CALIFORNIA
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE PROBATION IN CALIFORNIA 39 (1973). Professor Wald reports
that in 27.5% of all fitness hearings in Santa Clara County in 1971-72 the minor had
no attorney. (unpublished data on file with Professor Michael Wald, Stanford Law
School).
49. There are certain situations, however, in which the minor may wish to be
transferred to the criminal courts. See LAW AND TACliCS, supra note 1, § 11.2, at 252.
FITNESS HEARINGS
however, that any minor understands the importance of a fit-
ness hearing or the full consequences of transfer to the criminal
courts.5" Until such time as a full, understandable explanation
of what is at stake can be developed by the courts, no minor
should be permitted to waive his right to an attorney at a
fitness hearing. In other words, if the hearing is to be retained,
there should be an attorney present representing the minor.'
Standards for Determining Fitness
The question of which standards should govern the deter-
mination of fitness has been a source of contention in California
as well as in other jurisdictions.52 The basic difficulty lies in the
vagueness of the standards.53 The pre-1976 California statute
gave little guidance as to which factors the juvenile court could
or could not consider in determining the fitness question. Nei-
ther the gravity of the offense nor the fact that the minor de-
nied the petition was sufficient to support a finding of unfit-
ness.54 Moreover, a combination of offense and denial was like-
wise insufficient to support a finding of unfitness.5
Case law provided the California juvenile courts with more
specific guidelines concerning the fitness determination. The
following factors have been mentioned by appellate courts as
relevant: (a) the minor's behavior pattern, including any delin-
50. See generally Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 39 (1970).
51. The representation by counsel means nothing less than the right to effective
assistance of counsel. See Geboy v. Gray, 471 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1973) (minor's waiver
was invalid because of counsel's lack of zeal); In re Barker, 17 Md. App. 714, 720, 305
A.2d 211, 217 (1973) (counsel's duty is to search for a plan or range of plans which may
persuade the court that the welfare of the child and the safety of the community can
be served without waiver of jurisdiction). These cases suggest that if the minor is to
be permitted to represent himself at the fitness hearing, not only should he be able to
understand the consequences of this hearing, but, as an attorney, he must also be
zealous and effective in his search for an alternative plan to an unfitness finding.
52. See generally S. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES 112-16 (1974); LAW AND TACTICS,
supra note 1, at 255-61; Schornhorst, supra note 13, at 602-06; Stamm, supra note 13,
at 150-64.
53. One commentator described the former California law as "hopelessly vague."
Boches, Juvenile Justice in California: A Re-evaluation, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 47, 96 (1967).
See also Jimmy H. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 709, 714, 478 P.2d 32, 35, 91 Cal. Rptr.
600, 603 (1970).
54. CAL. WELt. & INST. CODE § 707 (West 1972) (current version at West Supp.
1977); see app. A infra.
55. Bruce M. v. Superior Court, 270 Cal. App. 2d 566, 572, 75 Cal. Rptr. 881,
885 (1969).
1977]
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quency;M (b) the length of treatment required;" (c) the nature
of the crime allegedly committed;" (d) the circumstances and
details surrounding its commission;" (e) the minor's degree of
sophistication, particularly as relating to criminal activities; 0
(f) any expert testimony the court in its discretion permits to
be heard;' (g) candor and contrition on the part of the minor;"2
and (h) whether the minor was amenable to a Youth Authority
commitment. 3 In addition, Kent v. United States offers an
appendix listing criteria the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered important in determining fitness."
Under the present law, in order to determine whether the
minor would be "amenable to the care, treatment and training
program available through the facilities of the juvenile court"' 5
the court may consider any one or a combination of the follow-
ing criteria:
(1) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by
the minor.
(2) Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction.
(3) The minor's previous delinquent history.
(4) Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate the minor.
(5) The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged
to have been committed by the minor.
It is important to note that under the current law a minor
56. Jimmy H. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 709, 714, 478 P.2d 32, 35, 91 Cal. Rptr.
600, 603 (1970).
57. Id. at 715, 478 P.2d at 35, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
58. Id. at 716, 478 P.2d at 36, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Donald L. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 592, 599, 498 P.2d 1098, 1102, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 850, 854 (1972).
62. Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 575, 587, 498 P.2d 1079, 1087, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 831, 839 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973).
63. People v. Joe T., 48 Cal. App. 3d 114, 120, 121 Cal. Rptr. 329, 332 (1975) (the
juvenile court must consider all programs available through the facilities of the court
before making a finding of unfitness). For a Minnesota case that goes even further, see
Welfare of J.E.C. v. State, 225 N.W.2d 245 (Minn. 1975).
64. 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966); see Vitiello, Constitutional Safeguards for
Juvenile Transfer Procedure: The Ten Years Since Kent v. United States, 26 DE PAUL
L. REv. 23 (1976).
65. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a) (West Supp. 1977); see app. C infra.
66. Id. That section provides that the "determination that the minor is not a fit
and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law may be based on any
one or a combination of [these] factors ...." (emphasis added).
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accused of a serious crime can be found unfit solely on the
circumstances and gravity of the alleged offense, whereas pre-
viously this standard alone had been held to be an insufficient
basis for a finding of unfitness. 7
While the current standards may appear broad, the
Juvenile Court Rules, prepared under the auspices of the Judi-
cial Council of California,6" will broaden the standards still
further. After listing the five statutory standards, those rules
suggest to juvenile court judges and referees that they may
consider "[any other relevant factors found by the court and
specifically recited in its order." 9
The Burden of Proof and Evidentiary Considerations
Under the 1976 statute and earlier case law the petitioner
had the burden of proof to show by substantial evidence that
the minor was not amenable to treatment under the juvenile
system.7 ° Under the current law, when the petitioner raises the
fitness question and the minor has been accused of one of the
crimes listed in Section 707(b),7' the burden shifts to the minor
who must demonstrate that he is amenable to treatment in the
juvenile court.
Focus upon the burden of proof, however, is somewhat
misleading. In all cases the juvenile probation officer must pre-
pare a social report72 concerning the minor's behavioral pat-
terns." In practice, the evidence contained in that report be-
comes the burden which one side or the other must overcome.
Thus, unless the minor or the district attorney can produce
sufficient evidence to counter the contents and recommenda-
tions in the probation officer's report, that social report will
generally prevail.
All evidence that is relevant and material is admissible in
67. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
68. CAL. JUv. CT. R. (effective July 1, 1977).
69. CAL. JUv. CT. R. 1348(b)(2)(F).
70. See People v. Arauz, 5 Cal. App. 3d 523, 85 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1970).
71. Section 707(b) is reproduced in app. C infra.
72. On the technical problem relating to the juvenile court judge's review of a
social report relating to the fitness question prior to the jurisdictional hearing, see
THOMPSON, supra note 20, at § 10.4.
73. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a) (West Supp. 1977). See app. C infra. See
also Bruce M. v. Superior Court, 270 Cal. App. 2d 566, 572-73, 75 Cal. Rptr. 881, 885-
86 (1969). The minor and his attorney are entitled to review any social records, in-
cluding the social report.
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a fitness hearing.74 Under this relaxed evidentiary standard, all
parties may submit social reports including opinions, progress
reports, and other kinds of hearsay evidence.75 Because the
court is focusing on the person before it rather than on the legal
question-did something happen-the fitness determination
more closely resembles the dispositional hearing than it does
the jurisdictional hearing.76
This broad standard of admissibility gives rise to a related
problem. Section 707(a)(5) allows the court to decide the fit-
ness question solely on the circumstances and gravity of the
alleged offense,77 but it does not indicate how the court is to
determine the extent to which the minor was involved in the
alleged offense. Thus, the mere allegation of criminal conduct
or reference to a police report or other case summary" could be
the evidentiary basis connecting the minor to the alleged crimi-
nal conduct. Moreover, under the current statute, the court is
not precluded from basing a finding of unfitness upon illegally
obtained evidence, illegally seized contraband or hearsay.
Thus, the court can find that the minor was involved in
certain delinquent behavior on the basis of evidence that would
never be admitted at the jurisdictional hearing-and would
certainly never be admitted at a criminal trial. Yet, under
current law, this type of record is sufficient to exclude the
minor from the juvenile system.
This problem stems from the failure to provide some kind
of evidentiary hearing prior to the fitness determination. At
other crucial junctures in both the juvenile and criminal justice
74. THOMPSON, supra note 20, at § 10.7, notes that "[tlhere appear to be no
limitations upon the evidence that the court may consider at the remand or referral
hearing, other than the basic tests of relevancy and materiality to the issue presented"
(emphasis in original).
75. See id. at § 9.4. See also People v. Chi Ko Wong, 18 Cal. 3d 698, 717-21, 557
P.2d 976, 988-91, 135 Cal. Rptr. 392, 404-07 (1976) (hearsay evidence used to support
a finding of unfitness).
76. Compare CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 706 (West 1972) with id. § 701 (West
Supp. 1977). Section 701 states in part: "The admission and exclusion of evidence shall
be pursuant to the rules of evidence established by the Evidence Code and by judicial
decision." See People v. Chi Ko Wong, 18 Cal. 3d 698, 717-18, 557 P.2d 976, 988-89,
135 Cal. Rptr. 392, 404-05 (1976). See also M. PAULSEN & C. WHITEBREAD, JUVENILE LAW
AND PROCEDURE 144-46 (1974) [hereinafter cited as PAULSEN & WHITEBREADI; Edwards,
The Defense Attorney at the Dispositional Hearing: The Need for Social Worker
Assistance, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 48 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Edwards].
77. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a) (West Supp. 1977). See app. C infra.
78. In practice, the court may review an offense report or summary prepared by
the probation officer, but hear no testimony. Defenses available to the minor and legal
questions such as the admissibility of certain evidence are not considered.
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systems, some kind of probable cause hearing is mandated be-
fore action may be taken by the court. Before a juvenile court
can detain a minor, he or she can demand a probable cause
hearing.79 Similarly, before a magistrate can hold a criminal
defendant to answer and bind him over for arraignment in
superior court, the defendant has the right to a preliminary
hearing.'" In both hearings, a factual basis must be established
before the court can take further action. Yet at the critical
fitness hearing a court may find a minor unfit for the juvenile
system without considering evidence on the circumstances and
gravity of the alleged offense. The failure to provide some kind
of probable cause hearing prior to the fitness determination is
a serious problem. 1 ' If the fitness hearing is to be retained, a
right to a prior probable cause hearing should be established.
Finding of Unfitness
The juvenile court must exercise discretion in finding a
minor unfit,82 and such a finding must be based on substantial
evidence. 3 The minor is entitled to a statement of reasons sup-
porting the order of remand to the criminal justice system.84
The failure to give this statement of reasons, although an error
of constitutional dimensions, may be harmless error.85
The finding of unfitness is not an appealable order 8 but it
has been frequently litigated either after completion of the
79. See, e.g., In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970);
In re Dennis H., 19 Cal. App. 3d 350, 96 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1971); In re Macidon, 240 Cal.
App. 2d 600, 49 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1966). See also Hoffman & McCarthy, Juvenile Deten-
tion Hearings: The Case for a Probable Cause Determination, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW.
267 (1975).
80. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 858-883 (West Supp. 1977).
81. Many states provide such a hearing. For the law in other jurisdictions, see
PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 76, at 146-47. See also Piersma, supra note 3, at
94. The provision for such a hearing in the Model Juvenile Court Act is set out in app.
D infra.
82. Richardson v. Superior Court, 264 Cal. App. 2d 729, 734-35, 70 Cal. Rptr. 350,
353 (1968).
83. Jimmy H. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 709, 713-14, 91 Cal. Rptr. 600, 602-
03, 478 P.2d 32, 34-35 (1970).
84. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966); accord, Juan T. v. Superior
Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 207, 211, 122 Cal. Rptr. 405, 407 (1975); see Vitiello,
Constitutional Safeguards for Juvenile Transfer Procedure: The Ten Years Since Kent
v. United States, 26 DE PAUL L. REv. 23, 40-46 (1976).
85. People v. Chi Ko Wong, 18 Cal. 3d 698, 722-23, 557 P.2d 976, 992, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 392, 408 (1976).
86. In re Brekke, 233 Cal. App. 2d 196, 43 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1965). Thus, if the
minor is found unfit, he would be taken through the entire criminal process and his
case finally adjudicated before the fitness determination could be appealed.
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case 7 or by a writ of mandamus after the fitness determina-
tion." The California Supreme Court recently clarified some of
the confusion surrounding the appeal of the fitness hearing. In
People v. Chi Ko Wong, the court held that an order pursuant
to section 707 may not be appealed after a criminal conviction,
nor may it be attacked by a motion pursuant to section 995 of
the California Penal Code. 9 This order may be challenged only
by an extraordinary writ in collateral proceedings prior to the
commencement of the trial on the charges for which the defen-
dant was found unfit.90
Appellate proceedings can stretch on for months or years
before a final determination is made.' Such litigation raises
the additional problem of what is to be done with the minor
found to be fit after a lengthy court battle. 2 Whether the minor
is ultimately found fit or unfit, the protracted proceedings will
generally work to the disadvantage of the minor since he is
growing older and more mature and will probably be less able
to benefit from any juvenile court program.
Return to Juvenile Court
One continuing problem the Legislature has yet to resolve
satisfactorily concerns the situation where a minor sent to the
adult system is thereafter returned to juvenile court. The 1976
statute created a complicated set of procedures allowing such
a return when the "circumstances and gravity of the offense"
87. E.g., People v. Joe T., 48 Cal. App. 3d 114, 121 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1975).
88. E.g., Jimmy H. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 709, 478 P.2d 32, 91 Cal. Rptr.
600 (1976); Juan T. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 207, 122 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1975);
Bruce M. v. Superior Court, 270 Cal. App. 2d 566, 75 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1969).
89. 18 Cal. 3d 698, 557 P.2d 976, 135 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1976). See also People v.
Benefield, 67 Cal. App. 3d 51, 136 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1977); People v. Rising Sun, 55 Cal.
App. 3d 1024, 128 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1976); People v. Allgood, 54 Cal. App. 3d 434, 126
Cal. Rptr. 666 (1976); People v. Browning, 45 Cal. App. 3d 125, 119 Cal. Rptr. 420
(1975).
90. 18 Cal. 3d at 714, 557 P.2d at 986, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 402. Furthermore, the
court noted, "[a] defendant who fails to avail himself of such a timely review will be
deemed to have waived any challenge to the propriety of the certification." Id.
91. The history of Morris Kent, petitioner in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541
(1966), gives an indication of the potential length of time involved. Kent was arrested
in 1961 when he was 16 years old. His case went through the courts until the United
States Supreme Court rendered its decision in 1966. Then the case was remanded for
further proceedings which were reported in 1968. Kent v. United States, 401 F.2d 408
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
92. For an understanding of the procedural problems involved in the review of
unfitness findings, see Note, Review of Improper Juvenile Transfer Hearings, 60 VA.
L. REv. 818 (1974). See also Schornhost, supra note 13, at 606-10.
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were found to be untrue or the charge was reduced in adult
court."
The section proved to be unworkable and was probably
ignored or misunderstood by judges and attorneys alike. 4 The
complexities were numerous. A magistrate at a preliminary
hearing was in the position to modify a superior court finding
of unfitness, and with the consent of the minor, return the case
to juvenile court. A superior court judge, again with the minor's
approval, could return the case to juvenile court either prior to
the attachment of jeopardy or after a verdict or finding has
been made as to each pending charge. Thereafter there was
nothing to prevent the juvenile court from finding the minor
unfit once again, based on different factors.
The current law repeals this section. 5 Now a minor found
unfit must remain in the courts of criminal jurisdiction. The
new law, while avoiding the complexities of the 1976 scheme,
has the potential for great unfairness. The gravity of the offense
might be the most important or exclusive basis for the unfit-
ness finding. Yet, if further inquiry at the preliminary exami-
nation or trial shows the original charges were exaggerated or
unfounded, the minor will find himself out of the juvenile sys-
tem,"6 with all the attendant disadvantages. 7
93. 1975 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1266, § 7, at 3560 (repealed 1976). See § 707.3 in
app. B infra.
94. In re Stanley, 62 Cal. App. 3d 71, 131 Cal. Rptr. 608, modified, 62 Cal. App.
3d 1030 (1976), gives an indication of how some closely related statutory provisions
were treated. In that case the minor was found unfit and remanded to the criminal
courts on charges of first degree murder and robbery. Pursuant to a plea bargain, the
defendant pleaded guilty to second degree murder. Neither the prosecutor, defense
counsel, nor the court was aware of § 707.2, which prohibited the minor from being
sent to state prison on such a plea. The court attempted to send the defendant to state
prison, but the court of appeal held that it could not. Section 707.2 has been substan-
tially amended again. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707.2 (West Supp. 1977). See app.
C infra.
95. 1975 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1266, § 7, at 3560 (repealed 1976).
96. Other technical problems have not been addressed by either the legislators
or commentators. Consider the minor who is found unfit and whose case is settled in
the criminal courts. Subsequently, he is arrested before his eighteenth birthday on a
new violation. Presumably the case must be filed in the juvenile court, but thereafter,
is the earlier determination of unfitness controlling in the second case? Would it
depend on the grounds of the previous finding and the results in the adult criminal
system?
97. The adoption of some kind of probable cause hearing prior to making the
fitness determination might alleviate some of this unfairness. See text accompanying
notes 74-81 supra.
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Conclusion
This overview of the procedural aspects of the fitness hear-
ing reflects a complicated, cumbersome, time-consuming, and
error-latent process. Although the changes suggested above
would alleviate some of the procedural difficulties, such modi-
fications might also add further complexity to the proceedings.
Unless there are significant policy justifications for the fitness
hearing, its continued retention seems questionable. The arti-
cle turns now to a review of the available data on fitness hear-
ing practices in California. This data reflects whether minors
throughout the state are being treated similarly at the fitness
hearing.
VARIATIONS IN FITNESS HEARING PRACTICE
Given the importance of the fitness hearing to the minor,
one might expect some consistency as to when these hearings
are held, how often minors are found unfit for the juvenile
court, and what factors judges utilize to determine fitness. De-
spite efforts to establish precise standards, 8 the fitness decision
remains within the broad discretion of the juvenile court.9 One
commentator has observed, "The reader should not be misled
by the careful formulation of these criteria into believing that
they are anything more than the articulated description of a
highly subjective process."'' 0 The following data confirm this
conclusion.
No statewide data have been published on the number of
98. See text accompanying notes 56-67 supra.
99. BESHAROV, supra note 30, at 254-59; PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 76,
at 139-44. Two commentators have noted:
Obviously, such criteria leave much to the discretion of the juvenile
judge. On the one hand, nebulous guidelines give the juvenile judge the
freedom to decide each case on its individual merits. The judge is free to
consider any and all information that anyone brings to his attention, and
he may be in a good position to consider the needs of each particular
child. On the other hand, such broad discretion puts the judge in a
position where it is extremely easy for him to make arbitrary decisions.
Mountford & Berenson, Waiver of Jurisdiction: The Last Resort of the Juvenile Court,
18 KAN. L. REV. 55, 64 (1969). See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at app. B,
table 5. The analysis of the varying criteria reveals a serious lack of relevancy and
uniformity. Mountford & Berenson, supra at 78.
100. BESHAROV, supra note 30, at 258. See also Comment, Juveniles, supra note
1, at 999. However vague the standards may appear to be, they have thus far withstood
constitutional attacks. E.g., Donald L. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 592, 498 P.2d 1098,
102 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1972).
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fitness hearings in each California county.'"' An in-depth study
for Alameda and Santa Clara counties in 1971-72101 reported for
Alameda County (estimated population 1,096,900)103 31 initial
fitness hearings'04 in which the minor was found unfit out of an
estimated 2,200 cases. 05 In Santa Clara County (estimated
population 1,178,900) there were 235 initial fitness hearings in
which the minor was found unfit out of an estimated 1,600
cases. 0 1 The ratio of findings of unfitness to the total number
of cases was ten times higher in Santa Clara County than in
Alameda County in the same two-year period.
The number of minors found unfit and remanded to adult
court varies widely by county throughout the state. In 1974, out
of a total of 55,388 reported cases, there were 666 remands to
adult court from initial petitions. 07 San Diego County (esti-
mated population 1,509,900) had 288 or 43% of the total re-
mands, whereas Los Angeles County (estimated population
6,961,200) had 19 or 3% of the total.' Contra Costa, Kern,
Orange, Sacramento, and San Francisco counties together
101. The figures prepared by the Bureau of Criminal Statistics include only the
number of minors actually found unfit. Letter from Roland F. Hartley, Chief, Bureau
of Criminal Statistics, California Department of Justice, Division of Law Enforcement,
to Leonard P. Edwards (Dec. 9, 1976) (data on the initial and subsequent petitions
remanded to adult court from juvenile court in California, 1975) [on file at SANTA
CLARA L. REV.].
102. M. Wald, Characteristics of Minors Found Unfit in Two Counties (unpub-
lished study on file with Professor Wald, Stanford Law School) [hereinafter cited as
Wald Study].
103. Population statistics are taken from BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CALI-
FORNIA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 1974: LAw ENFORCE-
MENT COMPONENT PROGRAM REPORT (CRIMES AND ARRESTS) (1975).
104. An initial fitness hearing is the first such hearing for that minor. A subse-
quent fitness hearing occurs later, generally on a separate petition.
105. There were no records kept of fitness hearings per se; the records reflect only
the instances where a minor was found unfit. According to Professor Wald, there were
approximately 10% more fitness hearings in Alameda County in which the minor was
found to be fit-thus the total number of fitness hearings is 34 or 35. This 10% figure
is based upon estimates from judges and probation officers.
106. According to Professor Wald, the total number of fitness hearings in Santa
Clara County (including those hearings in which the minor was found fit) was approxi-
mately 248-250, 5% greater than the number of minors found unfit. Approximately 40
minors were found unfit more than once during this period in Santa Clara County. See
note 96 supra.
107. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DIVISION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, BUREAU OF
CRIMINAL STATISTICS, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION IN CALIFORNIA 32 (1974). There
were 98 remands out of a total of 26,613 cases of subsequently petitioned minors. Id.
at 38.
108. Id. at 32-33.
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remanded only 11 minors to adult court."9
This wide disparity in unfitness rates indicates that judges
from county to county may be applying very different criteria
in deciding whether to find a minor unfit." This impression is
confirmed by Professor Wald's in-depth study of Alameda and
Santa Clara Counties. For example, Professor Wald found that
in Santa Clara County most minors found unfit were male
(90%), close to 18 years of age (more than half were 17 years 6
months or older), had committed relatively minor offenses
(15% major traffic, 8% auto theft, 8% petty theft, 6% minor
traffic, 10% burglary), and usually did not commit a crime
involving a weapon or physical injury to the victim. Moreover,
53% of the minors were not on probation at the time of the
offense. Only 30% were enrolled in school, however."'
In comparison, the Alameda County minors found unfit
were equally divided between males and females, the males
almost always were charged with a serious felony while the
females were generally charged with prostitution. The minors
were, on the average, six months younger than their Santa
Clara counterparts and most were wards of the court. Most of
the males were attending school, but this was not true of the
females.'
Overall, it appears that the court in Santa Clara County
was concerned primarily with the age of the minor and whether
he or she was living an "adult" life style, while the court in
Alameda County was concerned principally with the serious-
ness of the offense and the failure of previous rehabilitative
efforts." 3
109. Id. The 1975 figures released by the Bureau of Criminal Statistics confirm
the great variations among counties. Statewide (with 24 counties reporting no re-
mands) there were 608 remands to adult court from initial petitions. Of those, 337 were
from San Diego County alone. Los Angeles County statistics were not reported. Letter
from Roland F. Hartley, Chief, Bureau of Criminal Statistics, California Department
of Justice, Division of Law Enforcement, to Leonard P. Edwards (Dec. 9, 1976) [on
file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.].
110. See Wald Study, supra note 102. The disparity may also indicate that the
various counties have entirely different policies relating to the use of fitness hearings.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. The degree of variation in the use of the fitness hearing and the stan-
dards applied by the courts in making a fitness determination as reflected by the above
findings are consistent with other studies in California and in other states. See LAW
AND TACTICS, supra note 1, at § 11.4; PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 76, at 139-44;
Comment, Juveniles, supra note 1, at 1009-10; Comment, Juvenile Court Waiver: The




Although there are no data available on fitness hearing
practices under the new statute, the pattern under former pro-
cedures seems clear. It is evident that the decision to hold a
fitness hearing and the outcome of that hearing varies greatly
between counties, judges, probation departments and attor-
neys. Some counties resort to the fitness hearing much more
frequently than do others. Some minors are singled out for
fitness hearings, most are not. A minor's chances of being found
unfit may vary according to the county in which he is peti-
tioned, and more specifically, may depend on the juvenile re-
sources and facilities available in the county. It is not always
the seriousness of the crime or the potential long-term sentence
that governs fitness decisions, rather it is the minor's social
setting (particularly schooling) and his prior contact with the
juvenile court that seem to have the most significance to the
juvenile judge."'
The inconsistencies in determining fitness are not surpris-
ing when one considers the vague statutory standards coupled
with the differing performances and attitudes of the partici-
pants in the fitness hearing process. A judge's finding that a
particular minor is unfit for the juvenile system may be influ-
enced by the probation officer who prepares the social report."'
Under the new law, the policies and practices of the prosecutor
will also influence the number of fitness hearing petitions
filed."' On the other hand, a finding of fitness may be
prompted by the diligent defense attorney who presents an
alternative program for the minor within the juvenile justice
system." ' The inconsistent use of the fitness hearing from
county to county and from judge to judge, together with the
wide disparity in the standards applied to find a minor unfit
further underscore the need to question the basic premises for
maintaining this complex transfer process. We turn now to an
examination of those assumptions.
114. Contra, Keiter, Criminal or Delinquent? A Study of Juvenile Cases Trans-
ferred to the Criminal Court, 19 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 528, 530-32 (1973).
115. The probation officer's use of the social report as an adversarial document
is reported in R. EMERSON, JUDGING DELINQUENTS: CONTEXT AND PROCESS IN JUVENILE
COURT 16-19, 106-141 (1969) and Fogel, The Fate of the Rehabilitative Ideal in Califor-
nia Youth Authority Dispositions, 15 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 479 (1969). Fogel notes,
"an analysis of the final report upon which the child was committed to the CYA shows
that, in nine of the ten cases . . . commitment was the probation officer's intended
outcome." Id. at 484.
116. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
117. Geboy v. Gary, 471 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1973); BESHAROV, supra note 30, at
259-60. See also Edwards, supra note 76.
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Is THE FITNESS HEARING NECESSARY?
Several justifications for transferring certain minors to he
criminal system by the use of the fitness hearing have been
advanced." ' The most pervasive justification for transfer is
that some youths are too vicious and hardened to receive any
benefit from the rehabilitative programs offered by the juvenile
system. Closely connected to this premise is the belief that thejuvenile system cannot incarcerate and punish minors for suffi-
ciently long periods of time and, thus, the public is not ade-
quately protected from dangerous and violent youths. This jus-
tification is based upon the misconceptions that the juvenile
court mollycoddles violent youths, that the system is not con-
cerned with the protection of the public, and that there are not
sufficient facilities available to the juvenile court capable of
confining dangerous minors in a secure setting.
It is not true that the juvenile court treats hardened youth-
ful offenders lightly. In California, the juvenile court has for
many years been faced with the problem of what to do with
violent and dangerous young persons." 9 While the juvenile
court is founded upon an ideal of rehabilitation, it must and
does deal with youngsters who, for the protection of themselves
or others, need to be incarcerated. The California juvenile jus-
tice system has long recognized what one commentator wrote
in 1964: "In a great many cases the juvenile court must perform
functions essentially similar to those exercised by any court
adjudicating cases of persons charged with dangerous and dis-
turbing behavior. It must reassert the norms and standards of
the community . . . by such measures as it has at its dis-
posal."' 20
Similarly, it is not true that the juvenile court cannot com-
mit dangerous minors to appropriate facilities for long periods
of time. Minors committed to the Youth Authority generally
can be kept there for as long as adults committed to prison for
the same conduct. 2' Under the 1977 law, a sixteen- or
118. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
119. See CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF THE YOUTH AUTHORITY, CHARACTERISTICS OF CALIFOR-
NIA YOUTH AUTHORITY WARDS 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 CHARACTERISTICS],
which revealed that as of June 30, 1973, there were 239 wards in the Youth Authority
for homicide and 775 for robbery. The 1974 profile showed 257 in custody for homicide
and 1,036 for robbery. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF THE YOUTH AUTHORITY, CHARACTERISTICS OF
CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY WARDS 1 (1974).
120. F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 53 (1969).
121. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1769 (West Supp. 1977) provides:
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seventeen-year-old committed to the Youth Authority for a
crime not listed in section 707(b) may be kept until his twenty-
first birthday; if he has violated one of these crimes he may be
committed and kept to his twenty-third birthday. In either
case, sections 1800-1803 provide that a minor may be incarcer-
ated beyond the statutory limits for successive two year peri-
ods. '2 One need only compare these periods of time to the
sentences of the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976123
to realize that there are few crimes which would result in a
longer period of incarceration in the adult system." 4
(a) Every person committed to the authority by a juvenile court shall,
except as provided in subdivision (b), be discharged upon the expiration
of a two-year period of control or when the person reaches his 21st birth-
day, whichever occurs later, unless an order for further detention has
been made by the committing court pursuant to Article 6 (commencing
with Section 1800).
(b) Every person committed to the authority by a juvenile court who
has been found to be a person described in Section 602 by reason of the
violation, when such person was 16 years of age or older, of any of the
offenses listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707, shall be discharged upon
the expiration of a two-year period of control or when the person reaches
his or her 23rd birthday, whichever occurs later, unless an order for fur-
ther detention has been made by the committing court pursuant to Arti-
cle 6 (commencing with Section 1800).
It was recently held that the principle of People v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236, 551 P.2d
375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976) (defendant cannot be denied liberty beyond the maximum
jail term permitted by statute), does not extend to minors committed to the California
Youth Authority from juvenile court. Contra, In re Aaron, 66 Cal. App. 3d 564, 136
Cal. Rptr. 102 rehearing granted, (1977).
The current law is that a minor may not be kept in confinement longer than an
adult for the same charge. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 726(c) (West Supp. 1977)
provides in part:
In any case in which the minor is removed from the physical custody
of his parent or guardian as the result of an order or wardship made
pursuant to Section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not
be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum
term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted
of the offense which brought the minor under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.
122. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 1800-1803 (West 1972); id. § 1769 (West Supp.
1977). Furthermore, the Youth Authority may petition the court for commitment when
"the date of discharge occurs before the expiration of a period of control equal to the
maximum term prescribed by law" for the convicted offense. The court may then
commit the person to state prison. Id. §§ 1780-1783 (West 1972). Note that there is no
section comparable to §§ 1800-1802 which would permit imprisoned adults to be kept
beyond the maximum length of their sentences.
123. Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch.
1139, at 4752.
124. For instance, under the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act robbery in the
first degree can be punished by a sentence of two, three or four years in the state prison.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 213 (West Supp. 1977). A 16-year-old who is sent to the Youth
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It is interesting to note that under present practice most
minors transferred to adult court who are accused and found
guilty of serious crimes are committed to the Youth Authority
anyway. Under the 1976 law only unfit minors whose pre-
scribed sentence was death or life imprisonment could have
been sent to state prison by the courts of criminal jurisdic-
tion. 5 The present law makes it possible for the criminal
courts to sentence any sixteen- or seventeen-year-old who has
been found unfit to prison only after he has first been remanded
to the custody of the California Youth Authority for evaluation
and report.'28 The court may then sentence the minor to prison
only if, after considering the report, the court finds the minor
is not a suitable subject for commitment to the Youth Author-
ity.'2 In practice, this section should result in most remanded
minors being sent to the Youth Authority.'28
It should also be kept in mind that the dangerous or vio-
lent minor who is found unfit is usually eligible for bail under
the criminal system and for that reason may be out of custody
while awaiting trial. He is also a first-time offender in the adult
system and may receive favorable treatment from the prosecu-
tor or judge because of his age.'29 The criminal system may
provide less protection for society from the dangerous minor
than does the juvenile system.
Finally, it is not true that the juvenile system does not
have adequate facilities for violent youths. The range of dispo-
sitional alternatives available to the juvenile court judge in
Authority for a similar robbery can be kept there until he is 23, a total of seven years.
If the minor were found to be a person described in CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 1800-
1803 (West 1972), he might be kept even longer. However, under the revised juvenile
court law, the length of physical confinement for a minor in a § 602 case cannot be
greater than the maximum term for an adult convicted of the same offense. CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1977). Considering the complexities involved in
computing an adult's sentence under the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act, one
hesitates to predict how the juvenile court will set the maximum time in a § 602 case.
125. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707.2 (West Supp. 1977). See app. B infra. See
also In re Stanley, 62 Cal. App. 3d 71, 131 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1976).
126. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707.2 (West Supp. 1977). See app. C infra. The
court may send such a minor to prison even though the fitness hearing took place prior
to January, 1977, so long as sentencing is after January, 1977. People v. Benefield, 67
Cal. App. 3d 51, 136 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1977).
127. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707.2 (West Supp. 1977). See app. C infra.
128. The criminal court judge will probably continue to show great reluctance
to send a 16- or 17-year-old to prison when such an excellent facility as the Youth
Authority is available.
129. Inequities Cited in Adult Trials for Juveniles, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec.
1, 1975, at 3C, col. 2.
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California is broad. The California Youth Authority, county
ranches and camps, private and public institutions, group and
foster homes, and special probationary programs afford the
court the varied resources necessary to deal with the most hard-
ened and violent minors and to deal with those who pose no
threat to society.'30 The Youth Authority alone offers a range
of alternatives, from the strictest lock-up facilities to com-
munity programs and forestry camps with lower security.'
3
'
The unique characteristic of these alternatives is their ori-
entation toward rehabilitation and individualized treatment.
13
The juvenile justice system is based on the premise that reha-
bilitative efforts have their greatest impact on violent offenders
when they are young. 133 Thus, it is particularly important for
the juvenile system, rather than the criminal system, to work
with these dangerous minors. 34 The criminal justice system
offers nothing but exposure to older, often more sophisticated
criminals. The juvenile justice system is the best opportunity
our state has to divert these young people from a career in
crime. 35
Another justification advanced for the fitness hearing is
that the chronological age of a person is an arbitrary standard
for distinguishing those who should be dealt with by the juve-
nile system from those who should be within the adult system.
130. For a description of the different alternatives, see THOMPSON, supra note 20,
at §§ 9.7-.18.
131. The court, in People v. Hunnon, 5 Cal. 3d 330, 335, 486 P.2d 1235, 1238, 96
Cal. Rptr. 35, 38 (1971), observed: "The Youth Authority has a wide variety of means
at its disposal to deal effectively with youthful offenders, and it cannot be said with
accuracy that the agency is at the mercy of incorrigible minors." For example, in June,
1973, there were 239 wards in California Youth Authority custody for homicide and 775
for robbery. 1973 CHMACTERISTICS, supra note 119. Clearly, the Youth Authority han-
dles commitments of the most serious kind.
132. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 n.30 (1967); Stamm, supra note 13, at 145.
133. This premise has recently been questioned in Comment, Rehabilitation as
the Justification of a Separate Juvenile Justice System, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 984 (1976).
However, the confidentiality of juvenile records and the opportunity the juvenile has
to have them sealed, provides him with an opportunity to start life as an adult with a
clean slate. See note 15 supra. This important rehabilitative process is available only
to the juvenile. See Edwards & Sagatun, A Study of Juvenile Record Sealing in
California, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 524 (1977).
134. As one commentator has observed:
Although the courts and legislators have not regarded this phenomenon
[trial in adult court of violent crimes committed by 16- and 17-year-
olds] as a particular problem, . . . the welfare of our society as well as
the welfare of the youth accused of violent crimes is best served by keep-
ing the youth within the juvenile system.
Note, Waiver of Jurisdiction and the Hard-Core Youth, 51 N.D.L. REv. 655, 655-56
(1975) (footnote omitted).
135. See Bazelon, supra note 17.
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Thus, it is argued that persons exhibiting adult characteristics
(completed school, living away from parents, married, etc.) are
more like adults and should go before the adult court. On the
contrary, the sixteen- or seventeen-year-old minor living away
from home, married and working-at a difficult transition from
childhood dependence to adult independence-is probably
more amenable to treatment and more in need of the assistance
the juvenile probation department can offer. The suggestion
that the adult probation department can provide these suppor-
tive services while juvenile probation department cannot is
unpersuasive. Juvenile probation officers are known for their
dedication, hard work and excellent achievements. Because of
their unique skills and experience, the juvenile probation offi-
cers can offer more to the adult-like sixteen- and seventeen-
year-olds than can their counterparts in the adult system. Fur-
thermore, there is no standard in the current law permitting a
remand to the criminal system on such criteria"3 -and thus it
cannot be said to present a legal justification for the fitness
hearing. "I
Some would justify the fitness hearing by arguing that the
juvenile system should limit its jurisdiction to those minors for
whom there are sufficient rehabilitative resources available. A
finding of unfitness has never been made in California because
no rehabilitative facilities in the juvenile justice system existed
for that minor. Given the breadth of programs available at the
Youth Authority, no such problem should arise.'38
CONCLUSION
When the justifications for the fitness hearing are exam-
ined within the context of the juvenile justice system and the
facilities available to the juvenile court, they appear to be of
136. When the legislature specifies the precise grounds on which the finding of
unfitness may be based, it is contrary to long-standing rules of legislative construction
to permit judges to resort to unspecified grounds to justify their findings. "Under the
maxim of 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius,' the enumeration of acts, things, or
persons as coming within the operation or exception of a statute will preclude the
inclusion by implication in the class covered or excepted of other acts, things, or
persons." 45 CAL. Ju. 2D Statutes § 133 (1958).
Thus, as in § 707 where the statute has designated the specific grounds on which
a juvenile court judge may base a finding of unfitness, the judge may not resort to other
unnamed grounds. To permit the contrary would allow the judge to act in opposition
to the expressed mandate of the legislature.
137. See also THOMPSON, supra note 20, at § 10.4. But see CAL. JUV. CT. R.
1348(b)(2)(F).
138. See text accompanying notes 130-31 supra.
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questionable validity. Clearly, the arguments against this hear-
ing weigh in favor of its elimination. The fitness hearing is one
of the most complicated and cumbersome of juvenile court
proceedings, replete with procedural and substantive prob-
lems. '3 There is a lack of uniformity in the utilization of the
fitness hearing and inconsistencies in the standards applied at
that hearing. Further, inadequate notice to the minor specify-
ing the reasons for the hearing presents significant problems.
The flexible evidentiary standards create the Catch-22 di-
lemma that a finding of unfitness can be based on the nature
of the alleged offense before any determination of the extent to
which the minor is involved in the offense.
If the fitness hearing were abolished all these problems
would disappear. The savings in time, energy and litigation
within the entire justice system would be significant. Most
importantly, all young offenders would be assured of receiving
equal treatment under the same justice system. The elimina-
tion of the fitness hearing would provide fairer treatment to the
minor and increased efficiency within the juvenile justice sys-
tem. Abolition of this hearing would be a conscious investment
in all young people who come before the California juvenile
courts.
As Judge Skelly Wright has aptly observed,
[Tihere is no denying the fact that we cannot write these
children off forever. Some day they will grow up and at
some point they will have to be freed from incarceration.
We will inevitably hear from the Blands and Kents again,
and the kind of society we have in the years to come will
in no small measure depend on our treatment of them
now. 40
When the complications and legal hazards inherent to the fit-
ness hearing are added to the rehabilitative advantages of
139. Most critics of the fitness hearing suggest that it could be improved by
making standards more definite, by examining each case more carefully and by em-
ploying procedural techniques which would ensure careful consideration of each minor
before the court. See Stamm, supra note 13, at 131-32, 134-38; Comment, Juveniles,
supra note 1, at 1010-16. While well-motivated, these commentators would burden the
juvenile justice system with lengthy proceedings in every fitness case. Perhaps they
would insist on a 90-day diagnostic study in every case pursuant to CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 704 (West 1972)? Rather than further complicating and lengthening the hear-
ing, its abolition would be a simpler and fairer remedy.
140. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1974).
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keeping a violent youth within the juvenile system, the case for
abolition of this hearing becomes very persuasive. The juvenile
justice system has much to gain and a host of problems to lose
by eliminating the opportunity to transfer sixteen- or




Section 707. At any time during a hearing upon a peti-
tion alleging that a minor is, by reason of violation of any
criminal statute or ordinance, a person described in Section
602, when substantial evidence has been adduced to support a
finding that the minor was 16 years of age or older at the time
of the alleged commission of such offense and that the minor
would not be amenable to the care, treatment and training
program available through the facilities of the juvenile court,
or if, at any time after such hearing, a minor who was 16 years
of age or older at the time of the commission of an offense and
who was committed therefor by the court to the Youth Author-
ity, is returned to the court by the Youth Authority pursuant
to Section 780 or 1737.1, the court may make a finding noted
in the minutes of the court that the minor is not a fit and proper
subject to be dealt with under this chapter, and the court shall
direct the district attorney or other appropriate prosecuting
officer to prosecute the person under the applicable criminal
statute or ordinance and thereafter dismiss the petition or, if a
prosecution has been commenced in another court but has been
suspended while juvenile court proceedings are held, shall dis-
miss the petition and issue its order directing that the other
court proceedings resume.
In determining whether the minor is a fit and proper sub-
ject to be dealt with under this chapter, the offense, in itself,
shall not be sufficient to support a finding that such minor is
not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the provi-
sions of the Juvenile Court Law.
A denial by the person on whose behalf the petition is
brought of any or all of the facts or conclusions set forth therein
or of any inference to be drawn therefrom is not, of itself, suffi-
cient to support a finding that such person is not a fit and
proper subject to be dealt with under the provisions of the
Juvenile Court Law.
The court shall cause the probation officer to investigate
and submit a report on the behavioral patterns of the person
being considered for unfitness.
* 1967 Cal. Stats. ch. 1357, § 1, at 1357.
1977]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Appendix B
The Law from January 1, 1976-December 31, 1976*
Section 707. In any case in which a minor is alleged to
be a person described in Section 602 by reason of the violation,
when he was 16 years of age or older, of any criminal statute
or ordinance, upon motion of the petitioner made prior to the
attachment of jeopardy the court shall cause the probation
officer to investigate and submit a report on the behavioral
patterns and social history of the minor being considered for
unfitness. Following submission and consideration of the re-
port, and of any other relevant evidence which the petitioner
or the minor may wish to submit the juvenile court may find
that the minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with
under the juvenile court law if it concludes that the minor
would not be amenable to the care, treatment and training
program available through the facilities of the juvenile court,
based upon an evaluation of the following criteria:
(a) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by
the minor.
(b) Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction.
(c) The minor's previous delinquent history.
(d) Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate the minor.
(e) The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged
to have been committed by the minor.
A determination that the minor is not a fit and proper
subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law may be
based on any one or a combination of the factors set forth
above, which shall be recited in the order of unfitness. In any
case in which a hearing has been noticed pursuant to this sec-
tion, the court shall postpone the taking of a plea to the peti-
tion until the conclusion of the fitness hearing, and no plea
which may already have been entered shall constitute evidence
at such hearing.
Section 707.1. If the minor is declared not a fit and pro-
per subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law, the
district attorney or other appropriate prosecuting officer shall
acquire the authority to file an accusatory pleading against the
* 1975 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1266, §§ 4-8, at 3559.
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minor in a court of criminal jurisdiction. The case shall proceed
from that point according to the laws applicable to a criminal
case, provided, that unless the juvenile court specifically orders
the individual minor delivered to the custody of the sheriff
upon a finding that the safety of the public or of the inmates
of the juvenile hall cannot be otherwise protected, the minor,
if detained, shall remain in the juvenile hall pending final dis-
position by the criminal court. If a prosecution has been com-
menced in another court but has been suspended while juvenile
court proceedings are being held, it shall be ordered that the
proceedings upon such prosecution resume.
Section 707.2. Except as provided in Section 1731.5 and
1737.1, no minor who was under the age of 18 years when he
committed any criminal offense, and who has been found not
a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile
court law pursuant to Section 707, shall be sentenced to the
state prison, except upon petition filed pursuant to Article 5
(commencing with Section 1780) of Division 2.5. Of those per-
sons eligible for commitment to the Youth Authority, prior to
sentence the court may remand such persons to the custody of
the California Youth Authority not to exceed 90 days for the
purpose of evaluation and report.
With the exception of past or present wards of the author-
ity, no person shall be returned to the court by the authority
unless he has been remanded to the Youth Authority for diag-
nosis and report, and personally evaluated.
Section 707.3. Whenever any charge, the alleged circum-
stances and gravity of which were relied upon pursuant to Sec-
tion 707, is dismissed or found untrue by the court of criminal
jurisdiction, the minor shall be returned to juvenile court for
trial or disposition of any lesser charge which may remain out-
standing against him if the minor consents to being returned
to the juvenile court. In any other case, the minor may be
returned to juvenile court for the trial or disposition of any
charge pending against him if he consents to being returned
to the juvenile court. If jeopardy has attached in the criminal
proceeding, the case shall not be returned until a verdict or
finding has been made as to each pending charge.
Section 707.4. In any case arising under this article in
which there is no conviction in the criminal court and the
minor is not returned to juvenile court pursuant to Section
707.3, the clerk of the criminal court shall report such disposi-
tion to the juvenile court, to the probation department, to the
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law enforcement agency which arrested the minor for the of-
fense which resulted in his remand to criminal court, and to the
Department of Justice. Unless the minor has had a prior con-
viction in a criminal court, the clerk of the criminal court shall
deliver to the clerk of the juvenile court all copies of the minor's
record in criminal court and shall obliterate the minor's name
from any index or minute book maintained in the criminal
court. The clerk of the juvenile court shall maintain the minor's
criminal court record as provided by Article 13 (commencing
with Section 825) of this chapter until such time as the juvenile




The Current Law-as of January 1, 1977*
Section 707. (a) In any case in which a minor is alleged
to be a person described in Section 602 by reason of the viola-
tion, when he was 16 years of age or older, of any criminal
statute or ordinance except those listed in subdivision (b),
upon motion of the petitioner made prior to the attachment of
jeopardy the court shall cause the probation officer to investi-
gate and submit a report on the behavioral patterns and social
history of the minor being considered for unfitness. Following
submission and consideration of the report, and of any other
relevant evidence which the petitioner or the minor may wish
to submit the juvenile court may find that the minor is not a
fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court
law if it concludes that the minor would not be amenable to the
care, treatment and training program available through the
facilities of the juvenile court, based upon an evaluation of the
following criteria:
(1) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by
the minor.
(2) Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction.
(3) The minor's previous delinquent history.
(4) Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate the minor.
(5) The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged
to have been committed by the minor.
A determination that the minor is not a fit and proper
subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law may be
based on any one or a combination of the factors set forth
above, which shall be recited in the order of unfitness. In any
case in which a hearing has been noticed pursuant to this sec-
tion, the court shall postpone the taking of a plea to the peti-
tion until the conclusion of the fitness hearing, and no plea
which may already have been entered shall constitute evidence
at such hearing.
(b) In any case in which a minor is alleged to be a person
described in Section 602 by reason of the violation, when he
was 16 years of age or older, of one of the following offenses:
* CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE (West Supp. 1977).
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(1) Murder;
(2) Arson of an inhabited building;
(3) Robbery while armed with a dangerous or deadly
weapon;
(4) Rape with force or violence or threat of great bodily
harm;
(5) Kidnapping for ransom;
(6) Kidnapping for purpose of robbery;
(7) Kidnapping with bodily harm;
(8) Assault with intent to murder or attempted murder;
(9) Assault with a firearm or destruction device;
(10) Assault by any means of force likely to produce great
bodily injury;
(11) Discharge of a firearm into an inhabited or occupied
building, upon motion of the petitioner made prior to the at-
tachment of jeopardy the court shall cause the probation officer
to investigate and submit a report on the behavioral patterns
and social history of the minor being considered for unfitness.
Following submission and consideration of the report, and of
any other relevant evidence which the petitioner or the minor
may wish to submit the juvenile court shall find that the minor
is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juve-
nile court law unless it concludes that the minor would be
amenable to the care, treatment and training program avail-
able through the facilities of the juvenile court based upon an
evaluation of the following criteria:
(i) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the
minor, and
(ii) Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction, and
(iii) The minor's previous delinquent history, and
(iv) Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate the minor, and
(v) The circumstances and gravity of the offenses alleged
to have been committed by the minor.
A determination that the minor is a fit and proper subject to
be dealt with under the juvenile court law shall be based on a
finding of amenability after consideration of the criteria set
forth above, and reasons therefor shall be recited in the order.
In any case in which a hearing has been noticed pursuant to
this section, the court shall postpone the taking of a plea to the
petition until the conclusion of the fitness hearing and no plea




Section 707.1. If the minor is declared not a fit and pro-
per subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law, the
district attorney or other appropriate prosecuting officer shall
acquire the authority to file an accusatory pleading against the
minor in a court of criminal jurisdiction. The case shall proceed
from that point according to the laws applicable to a criminal
case, provided, that unless the juvenile court specifically orders
the individual minor delivered to the custody of the sheriff
upon a finding that the safety of the public or of the inmates
of the juvenile hall cannot be otherwise protected, the minor,
if detained, shall remain in the juvenile hall pending final dis-
position by the criminal court. If a prosecution has been comm-
enced in another court but has been suspended while juvenile
court proceedings are being held, it shall be ordered that the
proceedings upon such prosecution resume.
Section 707.2. Prior to sentence, the court of criminal
jurisdiction may remand the minor to the custody of the Cali-
fornia Youth Authority for not to exceed 90 days for the pur-
pose of evaluation and report concerning his amenability to
training and treatment offered by the Youth Authority. No
minor who was under the age of 18 years when he committed
any criminal offense and who has been found not a fit and
proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law
shall be sentenced to the state prison unless he has first been
remanded to the custody of the California Youth Authority for
evaluation and report pursuant to this section and the court
finds after having read and considered the report submitted by
the Youth Authority that the minor is not a suitable subject for
commitment to the Youth Authority.
Section 707.3 is repealed.
Section 707.4. In any case arising under this article in
which there is no conviction in the criminal court, the clerk of
the criminal court shall report such disposition to the juvenile
court, to the probation department, to the law enforcement
agency which arrested the minor for the offense which resulted
in his remand to criminal court, and to the Department of
Justice. Unless the minor has had a prior conviction in a crimi-
nal court, the clerk of the criminal court shall deliver to the
clerk of the juvenile court all copies of the minor's record in
criminal court and shall obliterate the minor's name from any
index or minute book maintained in the criminal court. The
clerk of the juvenile court shall maintain the minor's criminal
court record as provided by Article 13 (commencing with Sec-
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tion 825) of this chapter until such time as the juvenile court
may issue an order that they be sealed pursuant to Section 781.
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Appendix D
Model Juvenile Court Act*
Section 13. Transfer Of Jurisdiction To Criminal Court.
(1) Upon motion of the prosecutor, the juvenile court
may transfer to a criminal court jurisdiction of a child who is
alleged to have committed an offense on or after the child's
sixteenth birthday, which if committed by an adult would be
a felony. The court shall conduct a hearing to determine
whether jurisdiction of the child should be transferred to crimi-
nal court.
(2) The transfer hearing shall be conducted not more
than 10 days after the petition is filed.
(3) Written notice of the transfer hearing shall be given
to the child, his counsel, and the child's parents or guardian
not less than 72 hours before the hearing.
(4) When a hearing is ordered under this section the
court shall order the juvenile court worker to prepare a predis-
position study as provided in section 15 of this chapter. The
report of the predisposition study shall be submitted to the
court prior to the hearing and a copy shall be made available
to the child, his counsel, and the child's parent or guardian.
(5) At the hearing the court shall first determine whether
probable cause exists to believe the child committed the al-
leged offense. Incompetent evidence is not admissible in a
hearing conducted under this submission.
(6) Upon a finding of probable cause, the court shall con-
sider the following:
(A) The seriousness of the offense;
(B) The nature and extent of the child's past record
of adjudicated offenses, if any;
(C) The resources designed to care for and assist
children.
(7) The juvenile court may transfer jurisdiction of the
child to a criminal court if the court finds clear and convincing
evidence that both of the following apply:
(A) The offense allegedly committed by the child
evidences a pattern of conduct which constitutes a sub-
stantial danger to the public.
* Piersma, Ganbousis & Kramer, The Juvenile Court: Current Problems, Legisla-
tive Proposals, and a Model Act, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 88, 94 (1975).
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(B) There are no reasonable prospects for rehabili-
tating the child through resources designed for the care
and assistance of children.
(8) If the juvenile court transfers jurisdiction of the
minor to a criminal court, the court shall issue a written trans-
fer order containing specific findings and reasons for the order.
(9) If jurisdiction of the child is not transferred to crimi-
nal court, the judge conducting the transfer hearing shall not
preside at a subsequent adjudicative hearing concerning the
offense alleged in the petition.
(10) Testimony of a respondent at a transfer hearing con-
ducted pursuant to this section shall not be admissible in a
trial in criminal court.
